Using annual US data for gross domestic product originating by sector between 1947 and 1997 it is shown that a negative long-run relationship between inflation and the markup is present across the sectors as well as in the aggregate. A preliminary explanation based on industry structure is explored for the relative sizes of the impact of inflation on the markup in the long-run for the various sectors.
INTRODUCTION
and Russell (2000a, 2000b ) examine the proposition that there exists a negative long-run relationship in the Engle and Granger (1987) sense between the markup of price on unit costs and inflation. 1 The papers raise two important issues. First, are the results simply due to the use of aggregate macroeconomic data? And second, if the results are valid, do industry structure and the level of competition affect the estimated long-run relationship between inflation and the markup?
The investigation of the influence of industry structure on the cyclical behaviour of the markup has a long history in the empirical industrial organisation literature, starting with the papers by Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986 and discussed most recently by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Simon (1999) . These papers take no account of either the possibility that the markup may be an integrated series or that it bears a relation to inflation. We have argued elsewhere (see, for example, Banerjee and Russell (2000b) ) that regardless of whether one considers the markup of prices over marginal cost or over unit costs, the negative relationship between the markup and inflation is important and easily identifiable from the data. The robustness of this result is also evident from noting that it does not make any difference whether the markup is approximated as the inverse of the labour 1 We find that the levels of prices and costs are best described as I(2) processes and that except for Japan they cointegrate to the markup. In each case the markup is shown to polynomially cointegrate with inflation which is interpreted as a long-run relationship between the variables and that relatively high inflation is associated with a relatively low markup and vice versa.
share or constructed under parametric assumptions on the production function and steady state values for the markup, following Hall (1988) . This paper therefore considers both the above issues. First we estimate the long-run relationship between the markup on unit labour costs and price inflation for the US economy using aggregate data and then for each of the broad sectors and sub-sectors using annual gross product originating (GPO) by industry data for the period . Using the aggregate database we reestablish the general finding of a negative long-run relationship between the markup and inflation for the United States. Furthermore, we find that in each sector where inflation and the markup are I(1) the long-run relationship reappears. The second issue is then addressed by comparing the inflation cost estimates with the associated levels of competition in these sectors.
Before turning to the empirical estimation in Section 3 we first consider briefly why inflation may impact on the markup. Section 4 considers how competition affects the long-run relationship between inflation and the markup.
EXPLAINING THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON THE MARKUP
Explanations of the impact of inflation on the markup have focused on three separate pricing assumptions of firms; namely price-taking, non-colluding price-setting and colluding price-setting. Bénabou (1992) assumes price-taking firms where higher inflation leads to greater search in customer markets that increases competition and reduces the markup. Russell, Evans and Preston (1997) and Chen and Russell (1998) argue within a non-colluding price-setting model that firms are uncertain about the profit maximising price and face difficulties coordinating price changes in an inflationary environment. 2 They conclude that the coordination difficulties increase with inflation leading to a lower markup. Finally, Athey, Bagwell and Sanichiro (1998) and Simon (1999) assume colluding price-setting firms and argue that higher inflation and the associated higher variance of cost shocks makes it more difficult for firms to maintain collusive arrangements and this leads to greater competition and a lower markup.
An important aspect of all these theories is whether the relationships that they describe are of a long-run nature. For the models described by Bénabou (1992), Athey et al. (1998) and Simon (1999) , the relationship will persist in the long-run if the variance of price and cost shocks increase with inflation, leading to greater search or difficulty in coordinating price changes among colluding firms. Alternatively, Russell et al. (1997) and Chen and Russell (1998) argue that a negative long-run relationship exists if uncertainty persists in the long-run. In a price-taking world, firms simply need to predict the profit maximising price so that they can set the profit maximising level of output. In the long-run, firms can identify the profit maximising price with certainty and so uncertainty disappears. However, with price-setting firms in an inflationary environment it is unlikely that the uncertainty will disappear if the source of the uncertainty is the inability to coordinate price changes.
Furthermore, it is likely that uncertainty will increase with inflation as the frequency and / or size of the price changes in real terms increase.
2 A number of authors argue that firms find it difficult to coordinate price changes. For example, see Ball and Romer (1991) , Eckstein and Fromm (1968) , Blinder (1990) , and Chatterjee and Cooper (1989) .
GPO SECTOR ESTIMATES OF THE LONG-RUN

RELATIONSHIP
This section estimates the long-run relationship between inflation, p ∆ , and the markup of price on unit labour costs, mu , using the now familiar I (1) techniques developed by Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1995 . It is proposed that in the longrun firms desire a constant markup of price on unit costs net of the cost of inflation. Following Banerjee et al. (1998) and Banerjee and Russell (2000a) we write the long-run relationship:
where q , is the 'gross' markup and λ is a positive parameter and termed the inflation cost coefficient. and the markup net of the cost of inflation falls with increasing inflation in the long-run. 3 We would normally condition the long-run analysis on a stationary business cycle variable which would enable us to examine the short-run relationship between markup and the business cycle. However, the only available business cycle variables for the each sector is de-trended constant price GDP. Its use has two difficulties. First the series appear I(1). Second, measurement errors in the national accounts are likely to appear simultaneously in the price and output series so as to offset each other. This implies that estimates of the relationship between prices and output would be contaminated by the presence of the common measurement error. 4 For the standard Layard / Nickell model see Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) or Carlin and Soskice (1990) .
The theoretical derivation of (1) and a detailed discussion of empirical models relating the markup with inflation are considered in Banerjee et al. (1998) and Banerjee and Russell (2000a) . On an empirical level (1) can be interpreted as a particular I(1) reduction of the polynomially cointegrating relationship of an I(2) system. In this case prices and costs are I(2) and cointegrate to the markup and the markup in turn polynomially cointegrates with the differences of prices and costs. Under the assumption of linear homogeneity we can write the longrun relationship (1) as a function of the markup and price inflation alone.
Over the sample that we investigate it is likely that the competitive environment and technology have changed leading to unmodelled shifts in the gross markup, thereby making it difficult to identify a stable long-run relationship between the variables. 5 To capture these shifts the estimation proceeds with the inclusion of a trend. Spike dummies are introduced where necessary to capture the short-run erratic behaviour of the cost and price data.
The Gross Product Originating by Industry Data
The price and markup data are derived from the November 1998 Survey of Current Business published by the United States Department of Commerce for the period 1947-1997. This source provides annual estimates of the industrial distribution of gross domestic product by sector. Prices are measured at factor cost and the markup is defined as prices divided by unit labour costs. Table 1 lists the breakdown of the sectors by the 1987 SIC codes.
5 There is a conflict between the requirement for a long enough span of data to estimate the relationship and the likelihood that the longer the data the greater the chance of breaks occurring. This is especially the case using annual data. An unrestricted 'short trend' for the period 1947 -1966 is introduced to reflect these and other non-inflation influences on the markup. 7 The 'short trend' is significant in the aggregate estimates. Its appearance in the sector analysis is not uniform and indicates which sectors contribute to the decline in the aggregate markup.
Before estimating the system, the integration properties of the data were investigated using PT and DF-GLS univariate unit root tests from Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) . 8 Table 1 shows the integration properties of the markup and prices for each of the sectors. The markup is clearly I(1). It appears that inflation is also I(1) for most of the sectors except agriculture, nondurable manufacturing and wholesale trade where inflation appears I(0). 9 The I(1) systems analysis that follows further supports these conclusions of the univariate unit root tests. We initially proceed assuming that the markup and inflation for all the sectors are I(1) and return to the issue of the order of integration for inflation following the estimation.
Results of the GPO Sector Analysis
Leaving aside the sectors where inflation appears I(0) from the univariate unit root tests, the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector is accepted and a significant negative relationships between inflation and the markup may be taken to exist in these sectors. Our findings are based not only upon a 7 Following Doornik, Hendry and Nielsen (1998) in not restricting the 'short trend' dummy to lie in the cointegration space. A similar break in the long-run relationship is evident in the United States estimates reported in Banerjee and Russell (2000a) . 8 These results are available on request from the authors. 9 One implication of finding the prices are I(2) and the markup is I(1) is that prices are cointegrating with unit labour costs to provide the markup and supports the formulation of the long-run equation (1). consideration of the Trace statistics reported in Appendix A (where for some sectors there is a marginal rejection of the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector based on asymptotic critical values) but also upon looking at the roots of the companion matrix for the system. Under the maintained hypothesis of one cointegrating vector in a bivariate system with two I(1) variables the companion matrix has one root at unity and all other roots bounded away from unity. Our reasons for not relying solely on the critical values is that these are asymptotic and subject to finite sample distortions and sensitive to the presence of nuisance parameters such as constants, trends and spike or step dummies. If the critical values were to be recalculated for finite samples with the nuisance parameters taken into account, these are likely to be higher than the asymptotic critical values which would lead directly to more acceptances of one cointegrating vector.
The sectors for which the long-run relationship cannot be interpreted meaningfully (sectors 3, 8 and 13) are precisely those for which unit root testing leads us to conclude in favour of I(0) series for inflation. Consequently the question of a long-run relationship for these sectors cannot be answered. In these three sectors, if prices and the markup are I(1) this implies that prices and costs do not cointegrate to the markup as measured by the ratio of prices to unit labour costs. The roots of the companion matrix can no longer be interpreted as above since we no longer have a bivariate system of I(1) variables. Table 3 in the appendix along with the diagnostics for the systems on which the results are based. The long-run relationship estimated in Banerjee et al. (1998) and Russell (2000a, 2000b) re-emerges using the aggregate GDP and the aggregate private industry data. The coefficient estimate is very similar to those reported in Banerjee and Russell (2000a) for the United States once account is taken of the use of annual as opposed to quarterly data. The long-run relationship also appears strongly in the sectors providing the answer to the first question posed in the introduction, namely that the tradeoff between inflation and the markup is not only present in aggregate macroeconomic data but also appears in most of the sector data as well. 1948-51 -circle; 1952-65 -cross; 1966-71 -triangle; 1972-81 -diamond; 1982-97 -square 
Inflationary Episodes
COMPETITION AND THE LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP
While competition is a nebulous concept it is often argued that competition increases with the number of firms in an industry. The implication is that the economy better approximates the perfectly competitive case as the number of firms increase. A further implication is that there is a continuous spectrum of competitive states based on the number of firms from a monopoly with one firm to perfect competition with a large number of firms. Therefore, in a perfectly competitive price-taking world where there is no long-run relationship between inflation and the markup then 0 = λ and the markup is dependent on 'real' factors alone. One might then conclude that increasing competition reduces the inflation cost coefficient λ until in the limit of perfect competition 0 = λ .
However, this ignores the complications introduced by considering pricesetting rather than price-taking firms and the source of the long-run relationship between the markup and inflation. Assuming that an increase in the number of firms leads to a closer approximation to perfect competition in a non-colluding price-setting world one must also assume that more firms not only reduces market power but simultaneously reduces uncertainty and the missing information concerning the coordination of price changes. While the former is likely to lead to a reduction in the level of the markup, the latter does not necessarily follow with price-setting firms. It is more likely that an increase in the number of firms leads to an increase in uncertainty because it is more difficult to coordinate price changes. Greater competition for price-setting firms, therefore, leads to an increase in uncertainty and a larger inflation coefficient, λ . In the case of a monopoly an increase in competition would see a reduction in the slope of the long-run curve as the long-run curve rotates in an anticlockwise direction and the mean value of the curve for a given range of inflation falls. If at some point firms behave as price-takers, increasing competition will no longer reduce the slope of the long-run curve and the slope will increases as the long-run curve rotates in a clockwise fashion. However, the mean value of the markup will continue to fall with increasing competition.
This discussion suggests two things. First, the size of the inflation coefficient depends in part on industry structure. Second, as one moves through the spectrum of competition from monopoly to perfect competition, at some point the relationship between competition and the inflation coefficient reverses and this point will depend on the technology and nature of the industry itself.
Consequently there is no monotonic relationship between measures of competition and the inflation coefficient and the use of measures of competition to make comparisons across industries is difficult unless one controls for the pricing behaviour of these industries. 11
Using our results this argument can be shown graphically. Graph 3 shows the relationship between the inflation coefficients from the GPO sector analysis and two measures of competition. 12 In the top panel the relationship is with a 'sales-weighted' 4-firm concentration ratio. 13 The lower panel shows the relationship between the inflation cost coefficient and an 'aggregate' Herfindahl Index. 14 In both these graphs the implication is that greater 11 Geroski (1983) makes a similar point. 12 The data used to calculate the concentration ratios and Herfindahl Indexes are from the
Economic Census Establishments and Firm Size reports by the United States Census
Bureau.
13 The 'sales weighted' 4-firm concentration ratio is a weighted sum of the two digit 4-firm concentration ratios in the sector where the weights are the share of sales in total sales in the sector. For a straightforward explanation of this calculation see Henley (1994) .
14 Two steps are undertaken in producing the 'aggregate' Herfindahl Index. First, an approximate Herfindahl Index is calculated at the 2-digit level from the 4, 8, 20 and 50-firm concentration ratios. These indexes are real numbers and can be inverted, summed, competition lowers the inflation coefficient. However, removing the finance observation due to the measurement problems associated with the data, and communications and durable manufacturing because of the very high levels of industry concentration (and therefore unlikely to have the same pricing behaviour as the other sectors) we see that there is largely no relationship between the inflation coefficient and competition. This is shown in Graph 3b.
CONCLUSION
Using GPO data the finding of a long-run negative relationship between Notes: Statistics are computed with 1 or 2 lags of the core variables (see Table A2 ).
APPENDIX: DETAILS OF THE GPO BY SECTOR I(1) ANALYSIS
Reported are the test statistics of the final model reported in Table 2 . Q(r) is the likelihood ratio statistic for determining r in the I(1) analysis. 90 percent critical values shown in curly brackets { } are from Table 15 .3 and 15.4 of Johansen (1995) depending on whether or not a deterministic trend is included in the model. 
